不对称信息与高校教师评价体系发展

Information Disequilibrium and Development of University Faculty Evaluation System

本文运动不对称信息理论对高校教师评价过程存在的逆向选驿和道德风险进行分析，指出不对称风险的产生源自于高校教师专业服务的复杂性和评价结果的不确定性，通过委托代理理论框架，进一歩确认原因在于校方与教师之间存在信息分布不对称和偏好取向的不同。未来高校教师评价体系展的关键是要设计一种激励机制来实现有效的信号传递、信息甄别，推动激励兼容和声誉约束机制的建镇立。

This article analyzes the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard in the process of university faculty evaluation using the theory of information disequilibrium. It argues that these risks are produced by the complex nature of the academic professional service and the uncertainly in the results of faculty evaluation. The article further argues that ， through the framework of principal─agent theory， these risks are rotted in information disequilibrium betwe4n the university and its faculty and different orientations in their development needs. The main conclusion is that the key to the future development of university faculty evaluation system is to establish incentive mechanism with incentive that enables signal transfer and information screening， so that the evaluation system can function with inventive compatibility constraint and reputation constraint.