应试教育：一个学校行为的组织分析

The Examination-oriented Education: An Organization Analysis on the School Behavior

应试教育是中国教育的顽疾。从组织分析的角度看，应试教育产生的原因是：在微观层次上，升学率的考核制度使得学校有选择应试教育的动力和激励，而学校一旦成功选择应试教育来提高成绩和升学率，这一选择又会因为学校与学校之间的零和博弈竞争和路径依赖而得到强化和巩固，导致应试教育愈演愈烈；在宏观层次上，组织制度自上而下的约束机制由于学校和地方政府共同的利益处境，以及地方政府认为应试教育在提高升学率方面比素质教育更具“合理性”而难以有效运行，自下而上的约束机制也因为家长和教师认为应试教育在提高成绩方面具有“合理性”，以及教师与学校之间力量的不对称性而难以奏效，因此宏观的组织制度难以约束学校的应试教育行为。

The examination-oriented education is a chronic disease with Chinese education. From the perspective of organizational analysis， the reason why the examination-oriented education came into being lies in the following two factors. At the micro level， the checkup system on enrolment rate makes the schools have the motivation and incentive to choose the examination-oriented education. Once the schools succeed in improving the enrolment rate by choosing the examination-oriented education， this choice will become an increasingly enhanced interschool competition on zero-sum game and path dependence， thus leading to growingly fierce examination-oriented education. At macro level， because of the mutual benefit between the schools and the local government， as well as the fact that the local government consider it rational to increase the enrolment rate with the help of examination-oriented education， the superincumbent restriction mechanism of the organization system cannot function effectively. Meanwhile， this superincumbent restriction mechanism cannot prove effective when facing the view held by the teachers and parents that examination-oriented education is rational in increasing the enrolment rate. As a result， the macro organization system has difficulty in restricting the school behavior on examination-oriented education.