有限理性的[占优启发式]和[齐当别]决策模型的作为--当Allais悖论杠杆撬动了期望效用理论

A Comparison between Two Models of Bounded Rationality: Equate-to-Differentiate and Priority Heuristic Approaches

人们在做决策时常常要受到时间或知识的限制，有时还要受到其双重限制。关于人们是如何进行风险决策，早期有期望效用理论对其加以解释，但Allais悖论对其标准化地位提出了挑战。Simon的[有限理性]观点提出后，一些研究者开始致力于开发决策的[有限理性]模型。文章讨论并比较了无限理性的期望效用理论被Allais悖论杠杆撬动之后，有限理性的[占优启发式]和[齐当别]决策模型所能做的和所不能做的。两种模型的决策标准、计算策略以及未来研究的展望也一并作了讨论。

People are often restricted in their limited time or knowledge when making decisions. This raises a question of how people make risky decisions. In the early time， the Expected Utility theory gave a normative answer to the question. The status of the theory， however， was challenged by the Allais paradox. Simon rejected the idea of optimal choice， proposing the idea of bounded rationality. Since then， several researchers became interested in developing models of bounded rationality. In this paper， we compare and contrast Equate-to-Differentiate and Priority Heuristic approaches. We review the methods and the criteria， emphasizing the differences between them in terms of both the models they use and the computational strategies they employ. An implication for further research is discussed and suggested.