對道德自律的不同解釋：康德、皮亞傑和郭爾堡

Different Definitions of Moral Autonomy: Kant, Piaget and Kohlberg

本文以道德自律為主軸，追溯從康德、皮亞傑到郭爾堡的不同界定。自律的道德理想可以算是遵循啟蒙的傳統。但就道德自律內容的界定卻愈走愈窄，變成只是追求正義。本文指出，自律的概念自從康德定調之後，皮亞傑與郭爾堡是一脈相傳，普遍用來衡量道德行為的價值，但其可行性卻沒有改善。因此，本文提出六個批評：一、自主或自律為啟蒙運動的理想，但作為道德理想可能會有偏差；二、正義不是道德的最高標準，利他才是；三、自律與他律的重疊與不易判定；四、自律的道德標準有獨斷的可能；五、對自律的道德動機無法自圓其說；六、自律與他律：孰先？孰後？這些批評可能顛覆了當前教育理論與教育工作者的看法，若有謬誤之處仍請指正。

This article focuses on different definitions of moral autonomy by Immanuel Kant, Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. Since autonomy is considered to be the ideal of Enlightenment, the definitions of moral autonomy were narrowed and solely correspond to the pursuit of justice. While Kant’s definition of moral autonomy has become a tradition to be followed by Piaget and Kohlberg, autonomy as a measure for moral action did not improve. Six criticisms are raised in this article: 1. although the origin of moral autonomy is from Enlightenment, but it may not be an ideal in morality; 2. justice is not the only aim of moral autonomy, rather the core of morality should be altruism; 3. the difference between autonomy and heteronomy is very difficult to distinguish as personal motivation is involved; 4. moral autonomy can be dogmatic in moral decision; 5. the theory of moral autonomy is very difficult to be coherent in the explanation of moral motivation; 6. the sequence of autonomy and heteronomy is ambiguous. These criticisms may disrupt the general understanding of existing moral theories and perspectives among moral educators. The author is earnest in academic argument and welcomes criticism.