大学治理结构中的委托 — 代理问题 — 当前中国公立大学委托代理关系若干特点分析

Principal — Agent Issues in University Administration Structure

本文在吸收其它文献的基础上，试图把委托代理理论框架引入到对中国公立大学治理结构和管理续效的分析上来。在公立大学多级委托代理关系的链条上，第一层级代理人的行为选择与委托代理关系中隐形的激励契约相关。公立大学的产权关系与它特殊的目标、功能和使命，对代理成本的度量产生十分重要的影响。在某一环节上，委托人与代理人的非正常合作会改变正常情况下委托人与代理人目标函数不一致的现象，且代理人若不在正常的市场上依照市场机制进行挑选，大学的运行成本就会居高不下。解决我国公立大学中的委托一代理问题，需要重新构建合理的委托代理关系，这方面有赖于大学治理结构的突破，也有赖于政府新的制度供给。

This paper is trying analyze governance structure and management effectiveness of Chinese public universities by using principal—agent theory. At the multi—level Principal—agent chain in a public university， the behavior selection of the first level agent has a close relationship with hidden incentive contract. The property right relationship and its special goal， function and mission in public universities could greatly influence the measure of the agent cost. On some links， the abnormal cooperation between the principal and the agent would change their different objective function under the normal situation. If the agent is not chosen at the normal market， the university’s running cost will become high. In order to solve the principal—agent problems existing in Chinese public universities， some new reasonable relationship between the principal party and the agent should be constructed. This will rely on the breakthrough of university administration structure， as well as the government’s new system supply.