私立大專院校辦學績效、財務資訊揭露對補助與募款關聯性之研究   免費試閱

Effects of School Performance and Financial Information Disclosure of Private Universities and Colleges on Government Financial Support and Private Donation

從代理理論得知存在資訊不對稱問題時，辦學績效較佳的學校為避免被認為績效不佳，會提高其資訊揭露程度釋放正面訊息，以獲得更多來自於政府補助的收入，故辦學績效與財務資訊揭露程度影響了政府補助收入。若募款補助來自於創辦人或特定捐款人，此時，捐款人可以取得內部資訊做為捐贈決策之依據，故資訊不對稱之問題小，辦學績效及財務資訊揭露對捐款收入的影響較不明確。以2004～2008學年度私立大專院校資料進行實證研究，結果顯示，來自於政府補助收入與學校辦學績效、財務資訊揭露及學校規模呈現正相關，而與受企業支持呈現負相關，此結果與研究假說預期一致。來自於創辦人或特定捐款收入僅與學校規模及受企業支持變數呈顯著正相關，其餘變數皆無顯著相關，與預期一致。故當資訊不對稱問題小時，來自於特定人捐款收入與辦學績效及財務資訊揭露無顯著關係。

The principal-agent problem arises under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information. To avoid being considered with poor performances， schools with better performances will release positive news by providing a higher level of financial information disclosure to obtain more government financial support. Therefore， not only school performance but also information disclosure level has an effect on government financial support. The problem of information asymmetry is minor when private donations are received from founders or specific donors， who make donation decisions by internal information. The effect of school performance and financial information disclosure on donation is mixed. The analyses are based on data collected from 2004 to 2008. The empirical results are consistent with our hypotheses that government financial support is significantly positive correlated to school performance， financial information disclosure， and school size， whereas it is significantly negative correlated to schools that are supported by enterprises. Private donations received from founders or specific donors are insignificantly correlated to empirical variables， whereas they are significantly positive correlated to school size and schools that are supported by enterprises. Private donations received from founders or specific donors are insignificantly correlated to financial information disclosure when the problem of information asymmetry is minor.