直通他心的“刹车”: 五问具身模拟论

Putting the Brakes on Direct Access to Other Minds: Five Problems for the Embodied Simulation

直接社会知觉立场在认识论上质疑了基于理智主义的他心观。理解他心不是像后者所预 设的“心智思考另一个心智”，而应被视为“具身心智知觉另一个具身心智”。作为直接社会知觉的实体 理论，具身模拟论强调对心智模拟的核心概念进行再利用，经由镜像神经元活动产生的运动模拟，以一 种直接的、自动化的、前反思的加工方式来通达他心。然而，这个模型面临如下五个问题: 相似的大脑 － 身体系统并非社会互动的必要条件; 自身运动能力并非理解动作意图的必要条件; 镜像神经元经典 实验的解释并非不可兼容于心智化; 具身模拟并非是在刺激贫乏而是在刺激丰富背景下产生的; 镜像 神经元是联想学习而非自然选择的产物。

Based on intellectualism，many mainstream researches anticipate understanding other minds as“one mind thinking about the other minds”． In recent years，however，this view has been challenged by the“direct social perception”( DSP) ． According to DSP，problems of accessing to other minds should not be regarded as“mind thinking about minds”，instead，the explanandum in intersubjectivity must include“embodied mind perceiving embodied minds”． As a substantive theory of DSP，embodied simulation ( ES) emphasizes on reusing the core concept of mental simulation and posits a motion simulation as an automatic，unconscious， pre-reflective mechanism to go straight to the other minds，which is generated by the activities of mirror neurons． I propose five problems that should be addressed in order to support ES，and brake on direct access to other minds: ( 1) the similarity of brain-body system is not necessary for social interaction; ( 2) the priming of ES is affected by plenty of stimulus rather than the lack of stimulus; ( 3) activation of own motor program is not necessary for action understanding; ( 4) the accounts for classic experiments of mirror neuron is compatible with mentalizing accounts; ( 5) mirror neurons originate from sensorimotor associative learning rather than gene-based natural selection or adaptation．